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TOWARD A MORE PERFECT UNION: THE ROAD TO
MARRIAGE EQUALITY FOR SAME-SEX COUPLES
Jennifer Levi*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2001, I, along with my colleagues1 at Gay & Lesbian
Advocates & Defenders ("GLAD"), filed a lawsuit on behalf of
seven same-sex couples in Massachusetts challenging the
Commonwealth's discriminatory marriage laws. 2 As the case of
Goodridge v. Department of Public Health3 made its way through
the state courts, those of us committed to achieving a favorable
outcome realized that at the same time the case was being tried in
the courts, it would also be tried in the court of public opinion.
Then, as now, I realized that public discourse has a major effect on
the shape of any civil rights movement; and, in order to foster an
informed public opinion on the topic of marriage for gay and
lesbian couples, people had to have an understanding of the
broader context in which the case was moving forward. What
follows is one version of a talk that I gave to many different
audiences throughout the Commonwealth while the Goodridge
case was pending. My audiences included student groups,
community groups, legal groups, parent groups, and other groups
made up of people from the political right, the political left, and
every political shade in between. Especially in the aftermath of the
Goodridge decision, the value of the educational efforts made
alongside the case became even more apparent.
. Jennifer Levi is an Assistant Professor at Western New England College
School of Law. Many thanks to my colleagues at Gay & Lesbian Advocates &
Defenders for the ideas behind this piece and for their collaboration on the
marriage case discussed herein. Special thanks to Lisa Osiecki for the invaluable
research support she provided.
The four other attorneys on the case include Mary Bonauto, Gary Buseck,
Karen Loewy and Ben Klein.
2 Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
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Now that the case has been decided and the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts has twice ordered marriage licenses to be
issued to same-sex couples,4 the context of this broader struggle is
even more relevant. This Symposium issue discusses civil
unions-a proposed parallel, but separate status, that would
provide certain benefits, protections, and obligations under the law
to married couples. Its origin was a compromise struck by the
Vermont legislature. 5 The adoption of the Civil Unions Law sought
to placate gay and lesbian citizens of that state that challenged its
discriminatory marriage laws while, at the same time, mollifying
the opponents to gay and lesbian equality who wanted, at all cost,
to deny same-sex couples equal access to marriage.6
Since Vermont's adoption of that law, civil unions, though not
a term of art, 7 have become a placeholder for that compromise
4 On May 17, with much jubilation and celebration, marriage licenses were
issued to same-sex couples throughout the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
See generally Alan Cooperman, Church "Protect Marriage" Day Is Urged:
Groups Backing Amendment Seek Focus on Sunday Before Senate Vote, WASH.
POST, June 26, 2004, at A24; John McElhenny & Jenn Abelson, Church Groups
Rally on Gay Marriage, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 8 2004, at B3.
5 2000 Vt. Acts & Resolves 91, available at www.leg.state.vt.us/DOCS/
2000/ACTS/ACT091.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2004).
6 Jes Kraus, Note, Monkey See, Monkey Do: On Baker, Goodridge, and the
Need for Consistency in Same-Sex Alternatives to Marriage, 26 VT. L. REv. 959,
975 (2002). See also Michael Mello, For Today, I'm Gay: The Unfinished Battle
for Same-Sex Marriage in Vermont, 25 VT. L. REv. 149, 252-53 (2000).
As the members of the House Judiciary Committee made clear, the only
reason they opted for the cumbersome partnership option, rather than
choosing the more straightforward option of same-sex marriage, was
"political reality." That "political reality" is the homophobia that swept the
state in the wake of the Baker decision.
Id.
7 Civil unions, speaking formally, have a legal existence in only one
state-Vermont. Despite that, some legislators in other jurisdictions have used
the term civil unions to refer alternately to marriage equivalents or some
placeholder for a subset of rights that might be afforded to same-sex couples
under a proposed state law. See generally Rose Acre, Massachusetts Court
Upholds Same-Sex Marriage, Feb. 6 2004, at http://www.cnn.com/2004/
LAW/02/04/gay.marriage/ (last visited June 27, 2004) (discussing California
legislature's passing of a domestic partnership law and noting that "[s]everal
other states have granted limited marriage benefits to gays but called them
domestic partnerships"). Because the term is often used imprecisely, it is often
difficult, without a specific definition, to know precisely what one is talking
[Vol. 13832
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position. 8 As a placeholder, civil unions have become synonymous
with inequality. In this posture, I mean the term inequality to be
descriptive rather than subjective. While, admittedly, I
wholeheartedly believe that civil unions relegate gay and lesbian
couples to second-class status, that is not the sense in which I mean
to use inequality here. The only thing I mean by inequality in this
paragraph is that civil unions, however characterized or defined,
are not marriages. Those two statuses are not equivalent; they are
not equal.
Within that framework, in order for any one person to decide
where he or she stands on the issue of whether gay and lesbian
couples should be entitled to marriage, civil unions, something
else, or nothing, he or she must first understand why marriage
matters to families and how the Goodridge case and others fit into
the civil rights struggle to create equality for gays and lesbians as
well as into other civil rights struggles. Section II of this essay
describes several examples of how the exclusion from marriage
has harmed families, and, therefore, why it matters to people, gay
and non-gay alike. Section III describes the history of marriage as
it has evolved for same-sex couples and its relationship to other
civil rights struggles. Section IV describes the Goodridge case, its
about when they refer to a "civil union." A similar problem exists with the term
domestic partnership because of its varying definition across the country
including in state laws and private employment contracts. See, e.g., CAL. FAM.
CODE § 297; BOSTON, MASS. MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 12, § 9A (2004), available at
www.cityofboston.gov/cityclerk/domesticpartnership.asp (last visited June 27,
2004); University of Wisconsin-La Crosse, Human Resources: Domestic
Partnership Policy & Procedure, at http://www.uwlax.edu/hr/Domestic%20
Partnership.htm#definition (last visited June 27, 2004) (defining domestic
partners-with regards to employment and attendance at the university-as "two
individuals who, together, each meet all of the following criteria set forth in the
Domestic Partner Affidavit, UWS-50").
8 Frank Phillips & Raphael Lewis, Lawmakers Eye Civil Union Provision,
BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 10, 2004, at Al.
House and Senate leaders yesterday struggled to craft a revised constitutional
amendment that would ban same sex marriages, but give gay couples some
rights under civil unions. The strategy was designed to win enough votes for
passage of the amendment later this week by reaching out to lawmakers who
want to undo the historic Supreme Judicial Court decision that declared gay
marriage constitutional, as well as those who would like to extend some
rights and benefits to gay couples.
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outcome, and aftermath. 9 Finally, Section V takes up the question
of whether civil unions are a legitimate station on the way to
marriage rights or a misguided departure in a struggle for equality
and concludes that civil unions are an unacceptable alternative.
II. WHY MARRIAGE MATTERS
A. A Few Examples
There are countless examples of how gay and lesbian families
are harmed by the exclusion from marriage. Working at GLAD for
over six years, I received many calls from individuals, couples and
families experiencing serious legal problems as a result of not
being able to marry.
One example of the impact of discriminatory marriage laws
derives from a call I received several years ago from a woman
living on the North Shore of Massachusetts who came home one
day, only to find her partner of twenty-six years missing from the
home. Her partner had early onset Alzheimer's disease, so the
caller imagined the worst. It was nearly two days later before the
caller learned of her partner's whereabouts. She finally found out
from her partner's estranged family that they had removed her
partner from the home she was living so she could be in a long-
term care facility, four hours away from the partner but closer to a
mother and sister with whom the partner had had little contact over
a ten-year period. Had this couple been able to marry, as they
wished, they would never have been separated, nor could an
estranged family member have kept them apart. Because they were
not married and because there was a technical glitch in the
documents they had executed, the woman who called me had no
recourse to challenge the transfer decision made by her partner's
legal "family."'10 The caller was as significant as an interested
stranger to her partner of twenty-six years in the eyes of the law.
9 Because of the pace of post-Goodridge developments in conjunction with
the production of this Symposium issue, this Article may necessarily be
incomplete at the time of publication.
'0 See, e.g., Guardianship of Smith, 684 N.E.2d 613 (Mass. App. Ct. 1997)
(discussing requirements for durable power of attorney and causes for
disqualification).
[Vol. 13
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Most recently, the tragedy of September 11, 2001, has
highlighted the plight of committed gay and lesbian couples made
strangers by the marriage law's exclusion. One illustrative case
involved life partners of nearly thirteen years, Nancy Walsh and
Carol Flyzik. On that fateful day, Carol left Boston's Logan
Airport for a business trip on behalf of Meditech, her employer.'
2
When Nancy awoke to the same shocking news that confronted the
rest of the country, she had no way to get information from the
airlines about whether or not Carol was on the plane. 13 She was
regarded as a legal nobody in her efforts to get the most basic
information about the well-being of her partner of almost thirteen
years. 14 Nancy's difficulties continued from that point on to
include her inability to handle the day-to-day administration of her
affairs and those involving Carol's estate. 15 As a result of the law's
exclusion, Nancy was unable to renew the title of the car she
drives, which was in Carol's name, handle routine affairs of the
household, or administer the estate of her deceased partner. 16
Other examples making the same points abound, including a
surviving partner who could not fulfill his dying partner's wish to
be cremated because his legal family decided otherwise, 17 and the
surviving partner of a career firefighter who had no health
1 Margot LeSage, Together We Mourn. Farewell to Heroes: Valley
Mourns 2 of Its Own, EAGLE-TRIB., Sept. 20, 2001, available at
www.eagletribune.com/news/stories/20010920/NH 003.htm (last visited Mar.
29, 2004).
12 Carol Flyzik: Her Passions Were Human Rights, Her Victorian Home,
and, of Course, Her Partner, THE ADVOCATE, Oct. 23, 2001, available at
http://www.advocate.com/html/stories/849/849_flyzik.asp (last visited Mar. 29,
2004).
13 Kathleen Burge, Sept. 11 Leaves Same-Sex Partners Adrift Laws Bar
Benefits, Even Recognition, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 18, 2002, available at
http://www.commondreams.org/headlines02/0318-06.htm (last visited Apr. 12,
2004).
14 ld.
15/id.
161id.
" MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 114, § 5B (West 2001) ("Each such
cemetery corporation shall notify ... the family of the deceased or the person
making funeral arrangements for the deceased of the choice of three options for
burial services.").
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insurance because his partner could not secure it for him through
his public job. 18
Marriage matters. It matters in the most important of times-
times when families are vulnerable and the law needs to make
presumptions about who can act in another's best interests, who
can take care of family, and who can carry out the wishes of a lost
partner in ensuring the protection of remaining family. 19
B. Neither Laws of Contract Nor Piecemeal State Law Protections
Provide Comparable Protections
Some respond to this claim of marriage's importance to gay
and lesbian families that most of the law's protections can be
reproduced either by written contracts or by legal designations
such as guardianships or powers of attorney. While it is true that
gay and lesbian couples can secure a handful of the protections that
come with marriage, the vast majority of protections, rights, and
responsibilities of marriage are off limits to couples that cannot
marry.
There is simply no way to contract into the vast safety net that
exists for marital families. For example, no one can contract into
Massachusetts Health or other state social welfare systems that
protect the family home for the community spouse from the spend-
down provisions that are triggered when the other spouse has to go
into long-term care.2 1 No one can contract into the state worker's
compensation system that presumes financial dependency of a
18 See generally MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 32B, §§ 1-19 (West 2001).
19 See generally Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders, Protections,
Benefits and Obligations of Marriage Under Massachusetts and Federal Law:
Some Key Provisions of a Work-In-Progress, June 21, 2001, available at
http://www.glad.org/Publications/CivilRightProject/PBOsOfMarriage.pdf (last
visited Apr. 20, 2004); Brief of Amici Curiae Boston Bar Association &
Massachusetts Lesbian & Gay Bar Association, Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub.
Health, 798 N.E.2d 941(2003), available at http://www.glad.org/marriage/
Rights and BenefitsBrief.pdf (last visited Apr. 20, 2004).
20 Massachusetts Health is a state insurance program that provides health
insurance to those who qualify typically for financial or age-related reasons. See
MassHealth-Executive Office of Health and Human Services, at
www.mass.gov/dma/dmaidx.htm (last visited June 27, 2004).
21 See generally MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 118E, § 25 (West 2003);
MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 130, § 520.008(A) (1999).
836 [Vol. 13
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spouse when the other spouse is injured on the job.22 Nor can one
contract into the testimonial privileges that protect a spouse from
having to testify as to private conversations with a marital
partner;23 or into the survivor benefits that are provided for public
employees, such as firefighters and police officers;24 or into the
protections under federal Employee Retirement Income Security
Act ("ERISA") laws that require spousal consent to the assignment
of 401K earnings to anyone other than a spouse;25 or into access to
the judicial system to apply default divorce rules upon dissolution
of the relationship; 26 or into legal presumptions of parentage when
a child is born into the relationship. 27 Although there are a handful
of protections available to gay and lesbian couples, it is the
thousands of unreachable protections that make marriage central to
the issue of protecting families.
III. THE HISTORY OF THE STRUGGLE FOR INCLUSION
Having established the importance of marriage and the failure
of existing legal alternatives to provide comparable protections,
this section addresses the history of the struggle for same-sex
marriage and its relationship to other civil rights movements.
A. Historic Parallels to Be Drawn From Civil Rights
Movements for Race and Gender Equality
Race discrimination in marriage is longstanding in this
country and part of a shameful history. At the country's inception,
22 See MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 152, §§ 31, 32, 35A (West 1988).
23 See MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 233, § 20 (West 2000); MASS. GEN.
LAWS. ANN. ch. 11 IF, § 21 (West 2003).
24 See MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 32, §§ 100, 100A (West 2001).
25 See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-
406, § 205(d), 88 Stat. 829, 863 (1974).
26 See MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 208, § 34 (West 1998) (equitable
property division); 26 U.S.C. § 1041 (2001) (transfer without tax consequences);
26 U.S.C. §§ 62(a)(10), 215 (2000); MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 175, § 1101
(West 1998) (amended 2003) (continuation in spouse's health plan after
divorce).
27 MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 209C, § 6 (West 1998); MASS. GEN. LAWS.
ANN. ch. 46, § 4B (West 1994).
2004]
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28
nearly every state criminalized interracial marriages. It was
criminalized in Massachusetts as early as 1705 by statute.29
However, it was not until 1948, that the first state supreme court
struck down a miscegenation law as unconstitutional.3 And it was
nearly twenty years before the United States Supreme Court in
Loving v. Virginia 31 would do the same for all the laws remaining.
While no two civil rights struggles are the same-and this
author in no way contends that race discrimination and sexual
orientation discrimination are the same-there are some striking
parallels which bear closer examination. In both the race and
sexual orientation context, opponents to full and equal marriage
rights, contended that marriage, by definition, excludes the
inclusion of the couples challenging the laws. For example, in the
race context, the Loving trial court explained:
Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay
and red, and he placed them on separate continents. And but for
the interference with his arrangement there would be no cause
for such marriages. The fact that he separated the races shows
that he did not intend for the races to mix.
32
The updated form of this "natural law" objection to marriage
equality was advanced by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
As the Commonwealth's brief explained, exclusionary marriage
laws do not discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation because
"[h]eterosexuality is not a prerequisite for marriage, and many
homosexuals choose marriage to marry members of the opposite
sex for many reasons." 33 This natural law justification is no more
28 Josephine Ross, The Sexualization of Difference: A Comparison of
Mixed-Race and Same-Gender Marriage, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 255, 262
(2002).
29 1705 Mass. Acts 163; 1786 Mass. Acts & Resolves 3.
30 Perez v. Sharp, 198 P.2d 17, 34 (Cal. 1948).
"' 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967).
32 Id. at 3.
33 Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment and in Support of Defendants' motion for Summary Judgment at 51,
Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (No. 01-1647-
A), at http://www.glad.org/marriage/AGmemo.pdf (last visited July 26, 2004).
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defensible today than it was thirty (or fifty, or one hundred, for that
matter) years ago.
The way the history of public opinion has been shaped by the
struggle for race equality in marriage also provides some helpful
guidance for the right way to respond to the constitutional
deprivation provided by the discriminatory marriage laws. Some
have argued that the people, whether directly or through their
elected representatives-and not the courts-should decide how
best to respond to a constitutional deprivation. 34 Again, the history
of race discrimination in marriage provides a helpful lesson. There
is very little question that if the people had been left to decide
whether or not to extend marriage protections to interracial
couples, those couples would have been left out in the cold, as
revealed by polling data released by the New York Times around
the time of the Loving decision. 35 Just over thirty years ago, a
nationwide poll asked: "Do you approve or disapprove of marriage
between whites and non-whites?" In 1968, only twenty percent of
Americans approved while a full seventy-two percent disapproved,
and eight percent had no opinion. 36 Then, as now, leaving civil
rights up to a popularity contest would have done little to redress a
problem of constitutional magnitude.
Just as marriage includes a shameful history of exclusion
based on race, neither was it particularly a bastion of equality for
women. Historically, women lost all rights upon marriage.37 The
34 This has consistently been the position of the Governor of
Massachusetts, Mitt Romney, throughout the course of the Goodridge litigation
and beyond. See, e.g., Raphael Lewis, Romney Chides Legislature on Gay
Marrage, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 24, 2004, at B 1. Romney was quoted: "If it is a
real effort with real intent, then the Legislature will give me the occasion to
reach the Supreme Court and ask for a stay. Other wise, we will have same-sex
marriage in Massachusetts without a decision of the people." Id. (emphasis
added). Another article quotes Romney as stating that marriage "is the
foundation of human society, and that is something that the people should
decide, not one justice." Frank Phillips, SJC Ruling Aftermath: Travaglini Will
Call Convention Promises Vote on Gay Marriage Amendment, BOSTON GLOBE,
Feb. 7, 2004, at Al (emphasis added).
35 U.S. Found Most Opposed to Interracial Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
10, 1968, at 123.
36 
Id.
37 Margaret Valentine Turano, Law and Literature: Jane Austen, Charlotte
Bront&, and the Marital Property Law, 21 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 179 passim
8392004]
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classical line from Blackstone is that in marriage, the man and
38woman become one, and that one is the husband. Women, upon
marrying, lost the right to own property as well as to sue or be sued
in their own name. Indeed, they lost the right to criminal
protections from their husbands upon marriage. 39 This history is
similarly important to respond to the objection that marriage is
defined by that which it has always been. Just as, over time,
marriage evolved so as to fully include women within its rights and
responsibilities, so too may it evolve to include gay and lesbian
couples.
Over time courts across the country struck down unequal
marriage laws for women and racial minorities.4 ° In fact, over
time, nearly every discriminatory marriage law has been struck. In
cases involving challenges to exclusionary marriage laws waged
by incarcerated felons and individuals who willfully fail to pay
child support, the court has repeatedly explained that marriage is a
basic, fundamental, constitutionally protected right that may not be
denied to individuals based on personal characteristics unrelated to
purposes of the laws.4' So at the point in time of the Goodridge
litigation, the only individuals who otherwise met the statutory
requirements for marriage but could not marry, were gay and
lesbian couples.
B. History of Same-Sex Couples' Struggle
for Marriage Rights
And so it makes sense that marriage has become a focus of the
gay and lesbian civil rights movement. The first cases brought
(1998); Claudia Zaher, When a Woman's Marital Status Determined Her Legal
Status: A Research Guide on the Common Law Doctrine of Coverture, 94 LAW
LIBR. J. 459 passim (2002).
38 Lisa Kelly, Divining the Deep and Inscrutable: Toward a Gender-
Neutral, Child-Centered Approach to Child Name Change Proceedings, 99 W.
VA. L. REv. 1, 23 (1996). The author notes that "the common American practice
of surnaming reflects common law conceptualizations of the family as described
by Blackstone. The man and woman become one and the name at marriage
reflects that unity of identity as being situated in the husband." Id.
" Id. at 79.
40 E.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
41 See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434
U.S. 374 (1978).
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seeking marriage for same-sex couples originated in the 1970s.
Included among them were Baker v. Nelson,
42 Jones v. Hallahan,43
and Singer v. Hara.
44
The cases were far from ringing successes. To the contrary,
the plaintiffs were hardly taken seriously by the courts.
Procedurally, the cases were very similar to those later brought in
Hawaii, Vermont, Massachusetts, and most recently, New York,
California, Washington, Oregon and elsewhere. In 1972, plaintiffs
John Singer and Paul Barwick brought a lawsuit seeking to compel
the county auditor to issue a marriage license to them.45 The trial
court denied their motion on the basis that "there was no prima
facie showing that Washington law permits the marriage of two
people of the same sex, and that the denial of a marriage license to
two people of the same sex does not constitute an abridgement of
any constitutional rights." 46 The plaintiffs appealed the trial court's
decision, arguing that the trial court erred in concluding same-sex
marriages are prohibited under the Washington marriage statutes,
and that the court's order violated the Equal Rights Amendment
(ERA) of the state constitution as well as the Eighth, Ninth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
47
Unfortunately, the appellate court in Singer upheld the trial court's
decision and issued a dismissive comment that was typical of the
legal analysis in similar cases during that time, saying that "what
[the plaintiffs] propose is not a marriage., 48 It would be nearly
42 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971).
4' 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973).
44 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).45 Id. at 1188.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 1188-89 (footnote omitted).
48 Id. at 1192 (quoting Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 590 (Ky.
1973)). The court went on to reject parallels between the racial classification in
Loving and Perez and the present case by stating the following:
The operative distinction lies in the relationship which is described by the
term "marriage" itself, and that relationship is the legal union of one man and
one woman. Washington statutes, specifically those relating to marriage
(RCW 26.04) and marital (community) property (RCW 26.16), are clearly
founded upon the presumption that marriage, as a legal relationship, may
exist only between one man and one woman who are otherwise qualified to
enter that relationship.
Id. at 1191.
2004]
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twenty years before the gay and lesbian community would again
pursue its efforts for marriage equality.
The early 1990s saw two new cases arise. This re-emergence
of the marriage issue was in part fueled and supported by the
increased visibility of gay families especially in states allowing
second-parent adoptions49 and in part by the dire needs of families
as discussed in Section II, above.
One of the first suits filed in the second wave of marriage
litigation was Dean v. District of Columbia.5 ° Two gay men, Craig
Robert Dean and Patrick Gerard Gill, appealed a superior court
order that rejected their complaint requesting a marriage license
from the clerk of the superior court. They argued that the superior
court erred in holding that
51
"the District of Columbia marriage statute ... prohibit[ed]..
[c]lerk[s] from issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples[;]
... the [c]lerk did not unlawfully discriminate against [Dean
and Gill] under the District of Columbia Human Rights Act
52
... by refusing to issue them a marriage license[;]"
53
There is no analogous sexual classification involved in the instant case
because appellants are not being denied entry into the marriage relationship
because of their sex; rather, they are being denied entry into the marriage
relationship because of the recognized definition of that relationship as one
which may be entered into only by two persons who are members of the
opposite sex.
Id. at 1192.
49 See Baehr v. Miike, 910 P.2d 112 (Haw. 1996); Brief for Appellants,
Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941(Mass. 2003) (No. SJC-
08860); Elizabeth A. Embrey, In Re Bonfield: Are We There Yet? The Ohio
Supreme Court's Journey Establishing Adoption and Custody Laws in Ohio, 32
CAP. U. L. REv. 207 (2003); Press Release, National Center for Lesbian Rights
(NCLR), American Bar Association Votes to Support Second Parent Adoptions
(Aug. 13, 2003); Debra Barayuga, Gays' Fight May Turn to Rights and Benefits,
HONOLULU STAR-BULLETIN, Dec. 10, 1999; Jennifer C. Pizer, Lambda Legal,
Can Courts Agree on Second-Parent Adoption?, at www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-
bin/iowa/documents/record?record=268 (last visited Apr. 27, 2004); Lambda
Legal, Overview of State Adoption Laws, at http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-
bin/iowa/documents/record?record=399 (last visited Apr. 27, 2004).
'0 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. 1995) (per curiam).
51 D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 30-101 to -121 (1993).
52 D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-2501 to -2557 (1992).
" Dean, 653 A.2d at 309 (Ferren, J., dissenting in part).
[Vol. 13842
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and that marriage was not a fundamental right for gay men and
lesbians protected by the due process clause.54 The appeals court
affirmed the order denying their requested relief.
55
Cases filed in Hawaii and later in Vermont, though not leading
to equal marriage rights, showed more promise. In Hawaii, three
same-sex couples brought suit seeking equal marriage rights in
1991.56 Although they experienced an early initial loss at the trial
level affirming the state's motion for judgment on the pleadings,
they were buoyed by the Hawaii Supreme Court's reversal.57 Upon
reversal, the court explained that in order to defend the
discriminatory marriage exclusion the state would have to
demonstrate that the exclusionary law could pass muster under a
strict scrutiny standard.58
For perhaps the first time in United States history, a court
understood that a sexual orientation classification is sex
discrimination. After all, if one of the members of the lesbian
couple plaintiffs would be allowed to marry her chosen partner if
only she were a man and if one of the members of the gay male
couple plaintiff could marry his partner if only he were a woman,
the exclusion must be one based on the plaintiffs' sex as male or
female. In light of the Hawaii Constitution's inclusion of an Equal
Rights Amendment, the Hawaii Supreme Court explained that the
appropriate degree of review was the highest level of scrutiny. In
Hawaii, as in most jurisdictions, this articulation of the
applicability of strict scrutiny signaled to the litigants the likely
demise of the marriage law's exclusion.
As the plaintiffs had hoped, the state could not meet its burden
on remand. However, while the second trial court decision was
pending on appeal to the Hawaii Supreme Court, Hawaiian voters
amended their constitution creating an exception to the state sex
equality provision that had been the foundation of the couples'
54 Id.
55 Id. at 308 (per curiam).
56 See generally Jeffrey Schmalz, Hawaii Court Ruling Takes Step Toward
OK of Gay Marriages Experts Say Decision Could Have National Implications,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 7, 1993, at IA.
57 Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
58 rj
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case. Proving a point made earlier about the relationship between
civil rights protections and majoritarian views, 59 on November 3,
1998, Hawaii voted to adopt a state constitutional amendment that
allowed the legislature to decide who may enter into a civil
marriage, thereby ending any chance for equal marriage rights in
60that state.
The Vermont case went even a step further than the Hawaii
one. In the Vermont case, the Vermont Supreme Court agreed with
the plaintiff couples that the exclusionary marriage law violated
constitutional guarantees secured by the Common Benefits Clause
while simultaneously rejecting all of the justifications offered by
the state for the law. However, in arguably ambiguous language,
that court allowed the legislature to determine what the remedy
would be. After a contentious battle in the state house, the Civil
Unions Law was passed. 6 1 For the first time ever, a state created a
parallel, separate status for the unions of gay men and lesbians,
providing them all of the state-based benefits, obligations, and
responsibilities of marriage, while simultaneously affirming their
exclusion from marriage.
The result was a great step forward but one that left the
community far from the position of different-sex couples forming
families within the strictures of marriage.
IV. THE GOODRIDGE CASE AND ITS AFTERMATH
Building on a tremendous amount of education that had
already taken place in Massachusetts leading to a state
nondiscrimination law,
62 a safe schools law,6 3 a hate crimes law,
64
and the legislature's ratification of a high court decision allowing
second-parent adoption,65 GLAD turned its focus to Massachusetts
59 See supra Section III.
60 Id.; HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 572-1 (Michie 1998).
61 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1201-1207 (2002).
6 2 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 15 1B, § 4 (West 2004).
63 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 76, § 5 (West 2002).
64 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 39 (West 2002).
65 See Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315, 318-19 (Mass. 1993)
("person" in step-parent adoption includes jointly petitioning same-sex couples).
In 1999, the Massachusetts legislature ratified the high court's adoption ruling
by amending chapter 210, section 1 of the Massachusetts General Laws to
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where the recent census confirmed that same-sex couples with and
without children live and work in every community, every town,
and every county in the commonwealth.
In April 2001, GLAD filed suit seeking the right to marry on
behalf of seven same-sex couples in the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court. 67 The Goodridge case resulted in a favorable
decision in which the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
declared the legal exclusion of same-sex couples to be violative of
the state constitutional guarantees of liberty and equality.68 The
plaintiffs argued, and the court ultimately agreed, that there is a
fundamental right to marry that extends to all citizens of the
commonwealth, not just non-gay ones. 69 Although the plaintiffs
argued for heightened scrutiny based on both the fundamental right
expand the class of people who could adopt, leaving intact the decisions
interpreting the definition of person in chapter 210, section 1. See 1999 Mass.
Legis. Serv. ch. 3, § 15 (West).
66 The 2000 Census reported that "594,391 [unmarried] individuals ...
reported living with a same-sex partner." Kimberly Menashe Glassman,
Balancing the Demands of the Workplace With the Needs of the Modern Family:
Expanding Family and Medical Leave to Protect Domestic Partners, 37 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 837, 844 (2004).
67 Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 949-50 (Mass.
2003). Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders, GLAD Seeks Injunction Against
Commonwealth for Denying Marriage Licenses to Out-of-State Couples, at
http://www.glad.org (last visited July 31, 2004).
68 Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 968.
69 Id. at 965, 969. Some might argue that the court skirted this issue in
ultimately applying rational basis review of the exclusion. Id. at 961 ("Because
the statute does not survive rational basis review, we do not consider the
plaintiffs' arguments that this case merits strict scrutiny.") However, a closer
inspection of the dicta suggests otherwise. As the court explained, "civil
marriage has long been termed a 'civil right."' Id. (citing Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967)). "Marriage is one of the 'basic civil rights of man,'
fundamental to our very existence ... ." Loving, 388 U.S. at 12 (quoting Skinner
v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)). The court further cited Baehr v. Lewin, the
Hawaii Supreme Court decision that identified marriage as a civil right. Even
more than its reference to other cases, the court itself noted that "[w]ithout the
right to marry-or more properly, the right to choose to marry--one is excluded
from the full range of human experience and denied full protection of the laws
for one's 'avowed commitment to an intimate and lasting human relationship."'
Id. at 957 (quoting Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 889 (Vt. 1999)). It is hard to
argue that the court's references and language leave any room for doubt about
the nature of the right at stake in the case.
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at stake and the sex and sexual orientation classification of the
exclusion, the court found no need to go beyond simple rational
basis review to strike the discriminatory law.
7 0
The state offered three justifications for the discriminatory
law, each of which the court rejected. 71 As the high court
ultimately understood them, the state was heard to defend the
exclusion based on the following rationales: "(1) providing a
'favorable setting for procreation;' (2) ensuring the optimal setting
for child rearing, which the [state] defines as 'a two-parent family
with one parent of each sex;' and (3) preserving scarce State and
private financial resources.
7 2
The court addressed and rejected each justification in turn.
The court rejected the first justification out of hand saying starkly,
"[o]ur laws of civil marriage do not privilege procreative
heterosexual intercourse between married people above every
other form of adult intimacy and every other means of creating a
family." 73 Stated alternately, the court acknowledged that "[w]hile
it is certainly true that many, perhaps most, married couples have
children together ... it is the exclusive and permanent commitment
70 Id at 961. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's approach in
resolving the case on rational review reflects a recent trend of courts, including
the United States Supreme Court, in not explicitly addressing the level of review
where the exclusion is so devoid of justification as to fail under any scrutiny.
See also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S.
620 (1996). The approach reflects only that the classification cannot survive
under any level of review, not that the lowest level of scrutiny is the only
applicable one.
71 Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 961. It bears mention that the justification of
the state morphed somewhat during the course of the litigation. At the trial level,
the state's first justification was a defense of traditional marriage, or as the trial
judge characterized it, "the state's interest in regulating marriage is based on the
traditional concept that marriage's primary purpose is procreation." Id. (citation
omitted). On appeal, that justification transformed into what the Supreme
Judicial Court identified as "providing a favorable setting for procreation." Id.
Frankly, from this litigator's perspective, the initial justification was always
somewhat of a moving target, in part, because behind the language, the true
motivation for it seemed to be an animus-based position that was both untenable
politically and impractical legally.
72 Id. (citation omitted).
73 Id.
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of the marriage partners to one another, not the begetting of
children, that is the sine qua non of civil marriage."
74
As to the second justification, the court agreed "[p]rotecting
the welfare of children is a paramount State policy."75 However,
fatal to the state's justification was the lack of any relationship or
nexus between the exclusion in the marriage law and the asserted
policy. The court went on to explain that:
no evidence [supports the State's suggestion] that forbidding
marriage to people of the same sex will increase the number of
couples choosing to enter into opposite-sex marriages in order
to have and raise children. There is thus no rational relationship
between the marriage statute and the Commonwealth's
proffered goal of protecting the "optimal" child rearing unit.
76
To the contrary, in light of the fact that same-sex couples
throughout the state-including four of the seven plaintiff
couples-have children, the exclusion undermines the state's
interest in the welfare of children, rather than furthers it.
77
Finally, the court gave short shrift to the state's economic
justification of the exclusion. It deemed the state's
generalization-that same-sex couples are more financially
independent and therefore less needy of public marital benefits-to
be conclusory. 78 Even more, as the court explained, the laws do not
require a showing of financial dependence by married couples and
no such requirement should be imposed on same-sex couples.
79
The court recognized that even beyond the couples involved, same-
sex couples like different-sex ones, have dependents in their care.
80
The court concluded that these other dependents are no less needy
nor less deserving than the dependents of married couples.
8 1
74 id.
71 Id. at 963.
76 id.
77 id.
78 Id. at 964.
9 Id. at 963-64.
'o Id. at 964.
" Id. at 963-64.
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The court went beyond the plaintiffs' specific justifications
offered to reject the partially developed (but pressed by amici)
justifications offered by the state. In addition to dismissing the
primary three justifications, the court declared uncreditable other
rationales including that "broadening civil marriage to include
same-sex couples will trivialize or destroy the institution,"' 82 that
only the legislature can define and control marriage boundaries,
that allowing same-sex couples to marry would lead to interstate
conflict, 83 and that the exclusion is justified by "community
consensus that homosexual conduct is immoral.
8 4
In conclusion, the court acknowledged that "[t]he marriage
ban works a deep and scarring hardship on a very real segment of
the community for no rational reason." 85 The gulf between the
justifications offered and the harm the exclusion inflicts, reasoned
the court, "suggests that the marriage restriction is rooted in
persistent prejudices against persons who are (or who are believed
to be) homosexual., 86 The court concluded that the marriage ban
"violate[d] the basic premises of individual liberty and equality
under law protected by the Massachusetts Constitution.
87
Much has changed since the Goodridge decision. The decision
itself was subject to competing interpretations because of the
court's simultaneous issuance of a 180-day stay of the
effectiveness of the ruling. As a result of a nod to the legislature in
the decision, permitting the legislature "to take such action it may
deem appropriate in light of this opinion,"88 several opponents of
the outcome, including the governor and legislative leaders, read
into it the possibility of "wiggle room." 89 As explained, this
"wiggle room" would allow the legislature to respond by passing a
civil union law, comparable to that passed in Vermont, to deny
82 Id. at 965.
8 d. at 967.
84 id.
85 Id. at 968.
86 id.
87 id.
88 Id. at 970 (emphasis added).
89 See id. at 969-70 (noting the legislature's "broad discretion"). See also
Frank Phillips & Raphael Lewis, AG Suggests Bill: Same-Sex Benefits Without
Marriage, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 21, 2003, at Al.
848 [Vol. 13
TOWARD A MORE PERFECT UNION
marriage to same-sex couples while passing a law providing to
them all of the benefits, protections, and obligations under state
law.
Requesting an advisory opinion from the court, the Senate
sought clarification of the ruling. 90 In arguably an even stronger
decision, the court, in no uncertain terms, explained that no civil
union law could provide the equality called for by the Goodridge
decision.91 As the court clarified, equal means equal and "separate
is seldom, if ever, equal. 9 2 Certainly, explained the court, a
separate legal status available exclusively to gay and lesbian
couples is not equal due to the cross-cultural currency, history, and
intangible associations that marriage provides. 93 In addition, the
court said the that marriage, unlike civil unions, provides security
for couples when they travel and move as well as the opportunity
to seek federal legal protections even though currently denied by
an arguably discriminatory federal law. 94 As a result of the court's
clarification---or more accurately re-articulation, of the earlier
decision-supporters and opponents of marriage rights for same-
sex couples agreed on at least one thing: marriage licenses would
issue in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts as of May 17,
2004. 9'
Following the court's issuance of its advisory opinion relating
to the lawfulness of civil unions, the Massachusetts stage shifted to
the state legislature which took up a proposed state constitutional
amendment that would create an exception to the guarantees of
90 In re Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 566 (Mass.
2004).
91 Id. at 569-70.
92 1d. at 569.
93 See generally id.
94 Brief of Interested Party/Amicus Curiae Gay & Lesbian Advocates &
Defenders at 28-32, In re Request for an Advisory Opinion From the President
of the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565 (Mass. 2004) (No. 09163). See also Defense of
Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 2(a), 110 Stat. 2419 (1996).
95 Indeed, the first marriage license to issue to a same-sex couple in
Massachusetts was in Cambridge Probate Court. To celebrate the inclusion of
gay and lesbian couples in the state law, Cambridge opened its City Hall on
midnight of May 17, 2004. Thomas Caywood & Elizabeth Beardsley, Marry-
Thon Monday: Bay State Gays Ring in New Era, Cambridge Opens the Door,
BOSTON HERALD, May 17, 2004, at 5.
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liberty and equality and in turn deny gay and lesbian couples the
right to full equality, including the right to marry. 96 Having
avoided an earlier effort to amend the state constitution, 97 the
legislature in joint session took up a proposed, legislatively
initiated, amendment that sought to do the same thing.98 The
legislative debate raged fiercely over two months as legislators
staked out competing positions about the correctness of the
Goodridge decision and the need (or lack of it) to instantiate
inequality in the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights (the state
Constitution). The outcome of that debate was (by a 105 to 92
margin) the advancement of a proposed legislative amendment,
defining marriage as excluding gay and lesbian couples, to a
second legislative session. 99 The proposal, in addition to defining
marriage in an exclusionary way, would inscribe civil unions into
the state constitution as the only possible alternative for gay and
lesbian couples. Having passed the first hurdle required for
advancing a legislatively initiated amendment, that proposal must
yet receive a second majority vote of both houses of the next
legislative session in order to, at the earliest, advance to a vote by
the electorate in November 2006.100
Not finding immediate success in the legislature, the Governor
of Massachusetts has sought to limit, to the extent of his ability, the
effect of the Goodridge decision. In order to do so, he has latched
onto a Jim Crow era law often referred to as "reverse evasion" in
order to exclude any non-Massachusetts gay and lesbian couples
from marrying.' 0 ' Two lawsuits-one brought by married couples
96 Frank Phillips & Rick Klein, Lawmakers are Divided on Response,
BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 19, 2003, at Al.
97 John McElhenny & Jenn Abelson, Church Groups Rally on Gay
Marriage, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 8, 2004, at B3.
98 Id.; H.B. 3190, 183d Gen. Court, Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2003), available at
http://www.mass.gov/legis/bills/house/ht03190.htm (last visited July 31, 2004).
99 See Mass. Legislature Rejects Same-Sex Marriage, Approved Civil
Unions, CATHOLIC NEWS SERVICE, Mar. 30, 2003, at www.catholicnews.com/
data/stories/cns/20040330.htm (last visited July 31, 2004).
100 Id.
1o See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 207, §§ 11-13 (West 1998).
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and those who seek to marry,' °2 the other brought by twelve cities
and towns 13--challenge the discriminatory enforcement of the
antiquated law. 1
04
Through other events taking place across the country, the issue
of marriage for same-sex couples has taken center stage in a
national debate.10 5 In cities and towns across the country, for the
first time ever in United States history, marriage licenses have
issued to same-sex couples. Cities and towns that have already
issued licenses include San Francisco, California;' 0 6 Bernalillo,
New Mexico; 107 New Paltz, New York; 10 8 Asbury, New Jersey; 109
102 Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Whitacre v. Dep't of Pub.
Health (Mass. 2004) (No. 04-2656-G), available at www.glad.org/marriage/
coteMPI.pdf (last visited July 31, 2004).
103 Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary
Injunction, Johnstone v. Reilly, (Mass. 2004) (No. 04-2656-G) available at
http://www.glad.org/marriage/ClerksMPI.pdf (last visited July 31, 2004).
104 An in-depth discussion of the case is beyond the scope of this Article.
However, the basic grounds for challenging the statute and the Governor's
discriminatory enforcement of it are: (1) the statute is being misinterpreted in its
application to all non-residents; (2) discriminatory exclusion of non-residents
from the protection of Massachusetts law violates Article IV of the federal
Constitution (Privileges and Immunities); and (3) the statute violates the
guarantees of liberty and equality as articulated in the Goodridge case.
105 In addition to the legislative and litigation initiatives around the
country, a proposed federal anti-marriage amendment has been proposed but
has, so far, not advanced beyond its introduction. H.R.J. Res. 56, 108th Cong.
(2003); S.J. Res. 26, 108th Cong. (2003). The amendment as currently drafted
reads:
Marriage in the United States shall consist only of the union of a man and a
woman. Neither this Constitution nor the constitution of any state, nor state
or federal law, shall be construed to require that marital status or the legal
incidents thereof be conferred upon unmarried couples or groups.
H.R.J. Res. 56, 108th Cong. (2003); S.J. Res. 26, 108th Cong. (2003).
106 David Stout, San Francisco City Officials Perform Gay Marriages,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2004.
107 Susan Montoya Bryan, Same-Sex Couples Line up in Sandoval County
to Get Married, Feb. 20, 2004, available at http://www.abqjournal.com/news/
state/apwed02-20-04.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2004).
108 Associated Press, Who Needs California? Gays Can Tie Knot in N.Y.
Town, Feb. 26, 2004, available at http://www.nydailynews.com/front/
breakingnews/v-pfriendly/story/168188p- 146987c.html (last visited Apr. 19,
2004).
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and Multnomah County, Oregon." 0 In those and other states, court
cases have been filed and pursued to secure marriage rights for
same-sex couples, including New Jersey," Ore on,112
Washington, 113 West Virginia, " New York," 5 Indiana,1W and
California.' 17 Individuals and groups in other locations promise to
bring similar suits or seek the issuance of licenses from town
clerks.
109 New Jersey Same-Sex Couples Line up for Marriage Licenses, Mar. 9,
2004, available at http://edition.cnn.com/2004/LAW/03/09/nj.samesex.ap (last
visited Apr. 19, 2004).
"10 Tomas Alex Tizon, The Nation; Oregon Stands Solo on Same-Sex
Licenses, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2004, at A18; Ashbel S. Green, Deal Sets up
Marriage Ruling, THE OREGONIAN, Mar. 20, 2004, at A01; Statements of
Multnomah County Commissioners About Gay Marriage, THE OREGONIAN,
Mar. 5, 2004, at A 17; Oregon County Issues Same-sex Marriage Licenses, Mar.
3, 2004, available at http://www.cnn.com/2004/US/West/03/03/same.sex.
marriage (last visited Apr. 19, 2004).
... Same-Sex Marriage Suit Filed in NJ, CHICAGO TRIB., June 27, 2002, at
N18.
112 Noelle Crombie, Lawsuit Challenges Oregon on Marriage, THE
OREGONIAN, Mar. 25, 2004, at BO1.
113 Same-Sex Marriage Fight Reaches Washington State, Mar. 9, 2004,
available at http://edition.cnn.com/2004ILAW/03/08/same.sex.marriage/index.
html (last visited Apr. 19, 2004).
114 Chris Wetterich, Same-Sex Vows Case Will Not be Heard, W.VA.
GAZETTE, Apr. 4, 2004, available at http://www.wvgazette.com/webtools/print/
News/2004040133 (last visited Apr. 19, 2004).
115 Cyd Zeigler, Jr., Precedent May Determine N.Y Gay-Marriage Case,
Mar. 19, 2004, available at http://nyblade.com/2004/3-19/news/localnews/
precedent.cfm (last visited Apr. 19, 2004).
116 In re Infant K.S.P. & Infant J.P., 804 N.E.2d 1253 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004);
Ron Browning, Same-Sex Ban Argued Here: Restriction on Homosexual
Marriage Goes Before Indiana Court of Appeals, INDIANA LAW., Jan. 28, 2004,
at 1; Ron Browning, Lesbian Couple Finally Clears Adoption Hurdle: Court
Says Gary Woman Can Adopt Partners Adopted Children, INDIANA LAW., Apr.
9, 2003, at 5; Scott Olson, N.J. Ruling on Adoption by Gays Not Likely to be
Duplicated by Indiana, INDIANA LAW., Jan. 7, 1998, at 11.
117 See generally Harriet Chiang, Consolidate Marriage Lawsuits, Council
Rules, S.F. CHRON., June 12, 2004, at B4; Harriet Chiang, Judge: Combine
Same-Sex Lawsuits: He Recommends That Marriage Case be Tried in S.F., S.F.
CHRON., June 10, 2004, at B3.
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V. WHITHER CIVIL UNIONS
In this unbelievably transformed legal landscape, a discussion
of civil unions seems almost anachronistic. As one Massachusetts
state representative has said, "a year ago civil unions were the most
divisive issue in history. Now they are very boring to anyone who
isn't in one."'"18 Despite that sentiment, there is a strong argument
that civil unions have become a placeholder for the position of
those against the right of gay and lesbian people to marry and,
despite providing more protections for some gay and lesbian
couples than are currently available, should not be adopted.
The four principles reasons for opposing civil unions are (1)
gay and lesbian couples need and deserve equality and no separate
system, regardless of how comparable, can provide that equality;
(2) civil unions fall far short of marriage, as a practical matter
because their portability to states outside the jurisdiction of
issuance is questionable; (3) nothing short of marriage can provide
the far-reaching federal protections and responsibilities in light of
the so-called federal Defense of Marriage Act;119 and (4) as a
doctrinal matter, there is no legitimate justification for denying gay
and lesbian couples equality in marriage and, therefore, no civil
union law could survive scrutiny regardless of the applicable
standard of review. Beyond these more formalistic reasons,
however, lies perhaps the most compelling one. Civil unions are
explicitly intended to ensure that gay and lesbian couples do not
receive the equal marriage rights of non-gay couples. It is a strong,
clear and very public statement of discrimination that sullies our
society and the communities within which we live. For that reason
alone, no separate system, intended exclusively for gay and lesbian
families and provided for in order to intentionally exclude same-
sex couples from marriage rights, should be adopted or should
survive.
"8 Mary Leonard, Marriage Measure Revised to Allow Some State Rights,
BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 23, 2004, at Al (quoting Congressman Barney Frank).
19 1 U.S.C. § 7 (1996); 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (1996).
120 Notably, in Vermont, the only state to provide for civil unions, there
remains a serious question about the constitutionality of the existing law. Press
Release, Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders, Couples Announce
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As to the first reason, one must be mindful, as the Goodridge
court was, that marriage is far more than the sum of its parts. It is
not just about social security, marriage taxes, worker's
compensation protections, or divorce or intestacy laws.' People
do not generally marry for the reason of obtaining these benefits.
They marry because they love each other, because they want to
form and create families, because they bow to family and societal
pressures, because they want to make a public statement about a
private experience. In short, people marry because they fall in love.
And gay people want to marry for all of these same reasons.
Yet, no separate system-without the history and cross-cultural
currency that marriage has spawned-can offer gay and lesbian
couples the opportunity to make the same universally understood
statement about the nature and importance of our relationships.
22
Only marriage has the pedigree necessary to convey all of the
significance that it entails.
123
Termination of Baker v. State Appeal, (May 9, 2000), at http://www.glad.org/
News Room/press24-5-9-00.shtml (last visited July 31, 2004).
2' Brief of Interested Party/Amicus Curiae Gay & Lesbian Advocates &
Defenders at 26, In re Request for an Advisory Opinion From the President of
the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565 (Mass. 2004) (No. 09163) ("[Tihere is nothing that
has all the same obligations, rights and benefits as marriage but marriage ....
[M]arriage is not just a bundle of rights. Legal marriage is, and has been for
hundreds of years, a privileged status."). "Because it fulfils yearnings for
security, safe haven, and connection that express our common humanity, civil
marriage is an esteemed institution, and the decision whether and whom to
marry is among life's momentous acts of self-definition." Goodridge v. Dep't of
Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 955 (Mass. 2003).
122 See Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 957 (quoting Baker v. State, 744 A.2d
864, 889 (Vt. 1999)) ("Without the right to marry-or more properly to choose
to marry-one is excluded from the full range of human experience and denied
full protection of the laws for one's 'avowed commitment to an intimate and
lasting human relationship."'). See also Evan Thomas, The War Over Gay
Marriage, NEWSWEEK, July 7, 2003, at 38. ("Hillary [Goodridge] asked Annie
[her daughter] if she knew any people who loved each other. The little girl
rattled off the names of her mothers' married friends, heterosexuals all. 'What
about Mommy and Ma?' asked Hillary. 'Well,' the child replied, 'if you loved
each other you'd get married."').
123 The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that "[ft]he benefits
accessible only by way of a marriage license are enormous, touching nearly
every aspect of life and death. The department states that 'hundreds of statutes'
are related to marriage and to marital benefits." Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 955.
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As to the second reason, perhaps as important, a parallel legal
system has serious practical limitations as well. We have yet to
fully learn the implications for couples who obtain civil unions and
what significance will be attached to the relationship outside of the
borders of Vermont; yet the initial judicial results suggest vast
discrimination against civil unions outside of the state of
issuance. 124 Couples travel and move, and no one in a marriage
would wonder whether that marriage will be respected
everywhere. 125 No one from Vermont worries that when they get in
a car accident in New Hampshire their marriage will face
discrimination; and yet that is the situation for couples in civil
unions.
The third reason, which looms large, is that without the ability
to marry (and not simply enter into a parallel, separate system), the
full panoply of federal marital protections are off limits because of
the so-called Defense of Marriage Act passed in 1996126 that
enshrines discrimination into federal law. The Defense of Marriage
Act purports to do two primary things. First, it tries to circumvent
the federal Full Faith and Credit Act by specifically stating that
each state may decide for itself whether or not to recognize the
marriages of same-sex couples from other states. Second, it defines
for federal purposes marriage to be the union of one man and one
woman. Since its adoption, thirty-eight states have passed laws
124 See Rosengarten v. Downes, 802 A.2d 170 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002) cert.
granted, 806 A 2d 1066 (Conn. 2002) (unpublished table decision) (Connecticut
courts lack jurisdiction to dissolve a civil union because doing so-as contrasted
with dissolving a marriage---does not fall within any of the statutorily prescribed
areas that the court is empowered to decide); Hall v. Beauchamp, 833 So. 2d
123 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (unpublished table decision) (no child visitation
allowed while father had overnight guests to whom he was not married,
including his civil union spouse); Burns v. Bums, 560 S.E.2d 47 (Ga. Ct. App.
2002) (no child visitation allowed while mother's civil union spouse is in home
where divorce order only allowed child visitation in presence of adult overnight
guests to whom mother was married or related within second degree); Langan v.
Saint Vincent's Hosp., 765 N.Y.S.2d 411 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003) (recognizing
the plaintiffs standing to sue for the wrongful death of his civil union spouse).
125 Barbara J. Cox, Adoptions by Lesbian and Gay Parents Must Be
Recognized by Sister States Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause Despite
Anti-Marriage Statutes That Discriminate Against Same-Sex Couples, 31 CAP.
U. L. REV. 751, 757-58 (2003).
126 Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996).
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stating, in one form or another, that they will not recognize
otherwise lawful and valid marriages of same-sex couples entered
into in a sister state.
As to the part of DOMA that defines marriage for federal
purposes, we have yet to see its full implications because of the
recency of same-sex couples being able to marry and therefore
learn of the full impact of the law. Regardless of whether or not it
may preclude couples from receiving all federal benefits and
protections or just some, 127 its effect is draconian and many argue
unconstitutional.128 Without the ability to marry, even with a
provision for entry into a civil union, the federal statute may
remain unchallengeable. The fact that the adoption of a civil
unions law-instead of modification of the laws to include same-
sex couples in marriage-would continue to deny couples the
127 A comprehensive discussion of DOMA is well beyond the scope of this
article. Suffice it to say, however, that this author is unconvinced that it should
exclude lawfully married couples from all federal laws that in any way implicate
marriage. For example, there are numerous joint state and federal programs-
Medicaid for instance-which incorporate a state's definition of marriage (or
spouse, where applicable). The benefits of such programs should not be denied
to married same-sex couples. Note, however, that federal agencies have already
taken DOMA to arguably ridiculous extremes. For example, the passport
agency has interpreted the law to mean that the agency may ignore the legal fact
of a married same-sex couple taking a common name. See Franci Richardson,
Feds Deny Passport Name Change for Gay Man, BOSTON HERALD, July 28,
2004, at 15. Although a Massachusetts state statute provides that upon marriage,
the couple may take a common name, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 46, § ID
(1994), the federal passport agency maintains that DOMA requires it to ignore
the legal effect of the marriage and, therefore, the new name resulting from
operation of state law. Franci Richardson, Feds Deny Passport Name Change
for Gay Man, BOSTON HERALD, July 28, 2004, at 15. That position, if taken to
its logical conclusion, would mean that a federal agency could refuse to accept
dollars paid to it by a couple (or individual, for that matter) that were received
through a tax refund as a result of Massachusetts joint state tax filing-an
absurd position.
128 See Andrew Koppelman, Dumb and DOMA: Why the Defense of
Marriage Act Is Unconstitutional, 83 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1997) (arguing that
DOMA is unconstitutional under Romer v. Evans); Mark Tanney, Note, The
Defense of Marriage Act: "A Bare Desire to Harm" an Unpopular Minority
Cannot Constitute a Legitimate Governmental Interest, 19 T. JEFFERSON L. REV.
99, 99 (1997) (arguing that "by defining marriage to exclude gay men and
lesbians, [the DOMA] invidiously discriminates against gays, and unreasonably
interferes with their fundamental right to marry").
TOWARD A MORE PERFECT UNION
ability to challenge this odious federal law is yet another reason
why civil unions are insufficient to provide equality to gay men
and lesbians.
The final reason is a straightforward doctrinal one. Once one
acknowledges that the exclusion from the marriage laws-whether
or not there is a separate status in the form of civil unions-is not
simply definitional (that is, once one accepts that the exclusion is
real, explicit, and has the effect of denying gay and lesbian
individuals the ability to marry), 129 then regardless of the standard
of scrutiny, the state must have some justification for providing
only for a separate status, regardless of how comprehensive its
protections are. In some ways, the case for justification becomes
even harder once there are some laws in place that provide
protections to gay and lesbian families. In other words, once a
legislature acknowledges that gay and lesbian families exist (as it
must) and determines that such families are needing and deserving
of the law's protections, the question becomes how one can justify
any limitations on the comprehensiveness of the protections of
marriage. It is hard, if not impossible, to imagine any justification
other than raw animus as supporting a separate, parallel track. As
the United States Supreme Court has now twice recently explained,
such raw animus will not survive under any level of scrutiny.'30
129 Some, including the Commonwealth of Massachusetts have argued that
laws requiring that a marriage be between one man and one woman do not deny
gay men and lesbians the ability to marry because, after all, a gay man could
marry a woman and a lesbian could marry a man; they simply cannot marry the
person they fell in love with. See generally Memorandum in Opposition to
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support of Defendants' motion
for Summary Judgment at 46-56, Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798
N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (No. 01-1647-A), available at www.glad.org/
marriage/AGmemo.pdf (last visited July 26, 2004). Rejecting this argument
when first made in a race context, the California Supreme Court explained in
striking down that state's anti-miscegenation law as unconstitutional, "Human
beings are bereft of worth and dignity by a doctrine that would make them as
interchangeable as trains." Perez v. Sharp, 198 P.2d 17, 25 (1948).
130 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620
(1996).
2004]
WIDENER LAW JOURNAL
VI. CONCLUSION
As recently as 2003, commentators could only speculate as to
what our society might look like if gay and lesbian couples could
marry in this country. Too much has changed between now and
then to make a discussion focused on speculation interesting. Gay
and lesbian couples, many with children and many who have
already been in committed, loving relationships for decades, 13 1 are
now lawfully married and living throughout the country (indeed,
throughout the world). In light of recent, fast-paced developments
in the law with more to come, a discussion of civil unions is
anachronistic and, at the risk of putting too strong a spin on it,
shameful. Civil unions have become code for inequality and the
imposition of second class status on a community of law-abiding,
tax-paying, contributing members of our society. Moreover, civil
union-or more specifically, a marital status exclusively reserved
for same-sex couples that falls far short of marriage-is legally
indefensible. The question now should shift from whether we treat
these families with the equal dignity and respect they deserve to
how.
131 See Scott S. Greenberger & Bill Dedman, Survey Finds Women in
Majority, BOSTON GLOBE, May 18, 2004, at Al ("Two-thirds of the gays who
applied for marriage licenses yesterday were women, half of the couples had
been together for at least a decade, and an enormous majority were
Massachusetts residents, a Globe survey of 752 couples in 11 cities and towns
found.").
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